


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PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS
DEVELOPMENT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE IDEA OF IMMORTALITY

FAITH AND REASON IN RELIGION

Etc.

RELIGION AND THE TRANSCENDENT

LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, MAY 1929

BY

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G. G.

ST. MARY'S COLLEGE,
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LECTURE I

THE TRANSCENDENT IN
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Introductory—The importance for our problem of a just conception of religion. The phenomena of primitive religion. Early religion shows a rudimentary sense of the Beyond. Polytheistic religions and elevation of gods above the given world. Contrasted tendencies: sheer transcendence and pantheism. Neither is satisfying. Illustrations from Hinduism and Buddhism. Universal or Redemptive religions. Here conception of transcendent is vital. But transcendency not exclusive of immanence rightly understood. Both implied in ideas of “grace” and “revelation.”

RELIGION AND THE TRANSCENDENT

LECTURE I

THE TRANSCENDENT IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTORY

THE problem with which I wish to deal in these lectures is the problem of the significance and validity of the idea of the transcendent in religion. It is a matter on which opinions are divided. A good deal of recent thought tends to emphasise the importance of the immanent at the expense of the transcendent ; and we often hear it said that the conception of an immanent God is the only one which can satisfy the " highly reflective " modern mind. A transcendent deity, we are

sometimes told, is really a survival of an older stage of religion, and is no longer in harmony with current thinking; in fact, the alternative is between an immanent God and no God at all.

The discussion of the subject, however, suffers much from a lack of clear definition of the chief terms. The use of the word *immanence* is especially vague. In what precise sense, we ask, is God supposed to be immanent in the world? Does the phrase merely connote the presence of divine activity within the spatial and temporal order? or does it signify that the being of the world is a phase or manifestation of the being of God? Taken in the former sense immanence is compatible with theism. In the second sense the theory obviously involves pantheism, which cannot be reconciled with theism in the commonly accepted meaning of that word.

The notion of divine transcendency may be held to mean that the world and finite

spirits, if continuously dependent on God, do not fall within the being of God, and so are not in themselves elements or aspects of the divine life. Now it may be that this conception has sometimes been stated in a way which implies dualism, and thus conflicts with the idea that there is any real unity in the universe. But the critic, not content with urging this objection, frequently goes farther, and proclaims that only a thoroughgoing monism can give an adequate interpretation of the meaning and value of religion. Some "partisans of the One" no doubt admit a difficulty here, as witness the frank utterance of the late Mr. Bradley: "If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole."¹ Yet able and sincere thinkers will be found denying the first of these propositions, and contending that the religious

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 465.

consciousness is consistent with, nay even requires, the identification of the God of religion with the philosophic Absolute. Here everything turns on the way you answer the question, What does religion really mean and demand?

This might seem a straightforward question, one which requires and admits of a plain answer. But the trouble is that philosophers often identify the meaning of religion with what they think it ought to mean, and do not take much pains to study its actual working. It is easy to define religion so as to justify a particular interpretation of it, and speculative thinkers have frequently offended in this matter. Thus, if we define religion with Hegel as "the finite spirit's knowledge of its own essence as Absolute Spirit," we solve the problem of the transcendent in religion simply by ruling out the transcendent. Edward Caird sets out from substantially the same principle when he says: "God is the Infinite

revealing itself in all the differences of the finite, especially in the difference of subject and object, and through these differences remaining in unity with itself"; and he adds, "This is the only form religion can take in the modern world."¹

Perhaps the extreme example of setting out with a conception of religion which has little or no relation to religious experience, and excludes *in limine* the notion of transcendence, is seen in the present-day Italian idealists Croce and Gentile. Croce is quite sure that the truth of religion is philosophy, and for philosophy there is no reality but that which is at work around and within us. If Gentile treats religion less cavalierly, he none the less dismisses the transcendent in the religious sense as ultimately invalid, and reduces the appearance of transcendency

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, i., p. 295. Cp. with this Bosanquet's explanation of the meaning and spirit of religion as expressed in the phrase "Be a whole," or "Join a whole"—*What is Religion?*, p. 12.

to a moment or element within the life of the developing spirit.¹

There are other views of religion which stand rather closer to the empirical facts, and yet are based on such a one-sided interpretation of the facts that the problem of the transcendent is in effect set aside. If we ignore a definition like that of Salomon Reinach—"a body of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties"²—there remain the so-called sociological explanations of religion. Here religion is construed as a function by which society adjusts itself to its environment and conserves its own structure. In this case religion becomes a purely mundane affair, and in support of this contention Durkheim, for example, concentrates his attention on the phenomena of primitive religion.³ It

¹ *Discorsi di Religione*, pp. 75 ff. Gentile's discussion moves too much in the region of words and stereotyped formulæ, and pays too little heed to the real difficulties, to be helpful.

² *Orpheus, Histoire Générale des Religions*, p. 4.

³ *Vide his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Eng. trans.).

is easy to see, however, that his theory ignores a whole range of personal and spiritual experience which it is not capable of explaining. The antidote for all this is to study the facts with an open mind and without the desire to establish at all costs some preconceived theory. Our outlook must be comprehensive and impartial. When I am speaking of a just interpretation I may refer in passing to the view which is represented in Otto's well-known book *Das Heilige*. Here an extreme emphasis on the "numinous," the non-rational and mysterious side of religion, at the expense of the ethical element, results in a very unconvincing interpretation of the development of religious experience.

I have probably said enough to show that preconceived theories and personal preferences have often resulted in distorted representations of what religion really is. Religion, indeed, always involves an act of personal valuation, but we must try

to safeguard ourselves from a valuation which is purely subjective. It is only with an open mind that we can enter the kingdom of truth, and our subjective valuations have to be tested, and, where need is, corrected, by a sympathetic study of the values that have been operative in the historic development of religion. So stated the task is not an easy one, but by no other route can we hope to reach our goal, which is a just conception of what religion means. This, at all events, is the line we shall follow in trying to come to a conclusion on the problem whether the idea of the transcendent plays a vital part in the working of religion.

THE TRANSCENDENT IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

The field of religion embraces a vast and complex body of phenomena, always various and sometimes contradictory. The adventurer in this domain feels himself like a wanderer in a pathless forest who

cannot see the wood for the trees. And even when the outlines of the situation grow clearer, the difficulty remains of distinguishing the essential from the secondary, the relevant from the irrelevant, or, to put it otherwise, of discerning between the main movement and the side currents of religious tendency. In this task of establishing and finding a right perspective it is necessary to keep firmly in mind that the religious experience is a developing experience. For religion is never static : it undergoes a process of change, sometimes slow, sometimes swift, and these changes are always significant of emerging human needs.

Man demands a full satisfaction of his spiritual nature through his religion, and when a religion passes into some fresh form this is due to some need that was not fully satisfied. Religion is essentially living, and there is truth in the idea that we only realise how much there is in any living process when we see

what comes out of it. Hence I believe we are certain to miss much, and are very likely to draw wrong conclusions, if we try to interpret religion through one or other of its forms or partial phases, regarding that as something complete and sufficient and a clue to the meaning of the whole. Thus some have rushed to the conclusion that what is vaguely called "primitive religion" somehow supplies a key to the understanding of all religion. The truth is that we must regard the later fruits as well as the first seeds, if we are to gather the significance of the long life of religion in the world.

At first blush it might seem that early religion has no place for the transcendent : it bears on its face a character which is very sensuous and material, it is something of the "earth earthy." Let us look, however, at the phenomena more closely, and try to gather, if we can, the direction in which they point. Let it be granted that savage religion, on the surface, appears

to be a purely mundane affair, crude and sensuous throughout. The powers men worship seem to lie wholly within the given world. According to an earlier theory man became conscious of a spirit in himself, and imaginatively peopled the objects in his environment with similar spirits. And however the idea was reached it is certain that spiritism played a great part in early religion.

On the other hand, it has been recently shown that there was more in primitive religion than spiritism. Behind and older than the belief in spirits was an awe for a vague and impersonal power—of which words like *mana*, *orenda*, are the symbol—a power which might reside in objects or attach to specific acts. A pervasive and secret force, mysterious in its operation and fraught with good or evil in its working, penetrates the atmosphere in which savage man lives and breathes. This belief is common to magic and religion, and it is plausible to

suppose that both developed from the same matrix. The world in which primitive man lives seems to have been a world of indeterminate and uncanny powers, which might be harmful or helpful, yet were always in some way mysterious. It is probable that at this stage no clear distinction was drawn between religious and magical rites. The difference between the organic and the inorganic was not a problem for the savage: the distinction which counted was that between the operative and the inoperative, the useful and the useless. The idea of *mana* or mysterious power, which may be drawn on for human purposes, lies at the root of phenomena like Fetishism and Totemism. A further development of this deep-rooted and basal belief, a development due to man's psychical experience, was spiritism. Here the power, or *numen*, was envisaged as a soul which had its abode in an object. The spirit, conceived as freely moving, by its presence in the thing conferred on it

its mysterious efficiency and its right to reverence.

Here, then, we can discern the beginnings of a movement that has proved all-important in religion. I refer to the selection and separation of objects which have a religious value from those which have it not. Wherein lies the secret of this act of selection? To say that some chance impression decided the issue is not enough. The impression must have had some quality, general and yet definite; it must have evoked a mental reaction quite specific in its character, in order to determine universally the religious attitude. Here, I think, lies the element of truth in the views of Otto.¹ In his own peculiar terminology he describes this experience as the sense of the numinous, a feeling of the mysterious, the uncanny, and the awful, a feeling in virtue of which the object at once attracts

¹ Otto is not entirely original in his theory. He was to some extent anticipated by Marett as also by Windelband.

and repels. He speaks of it as the feeling of something "wholly other," the sense of a "presence," *numen inest*.

Otto's mistake, I have already pointed out, is to exaggerate the scope and bearing of this principle, which is really operative though in a more restricted way than he supposes. But beyond doubt this sense of awe lies behind and explains the act of selection which eventually separated the sacred from the non-sacred. The distinction therefore has its ground in a strong emotional reaction. When the emotional attitude became qualified by a sense of dependence on the mysterious object, we see the beginning of the movement of mind which became definitely religious. So long as man was dominated by the belief that he could manipulate and control the object through the secret of the spell, he remained in the sphere of magic.

Let us consider more closely certain features in the development of the reli-

gious relation, and try to gather what they suggest. The mysterious and uncanny powers which early man revered inspired fear as well as trust. In the case of the spirits of the dead, belief in which is deep-rooted and runs through primitive culture, the prevailing attitude was one of fear, and their return to their old haunts was dreaded. Yet even with a power from which man expected some good there was present a dangerous element, and this would assert itself against any rash or unwarranted intrusion. This dangerous element is the source of the widespread principle of Tabu, which works as a negative factor by defining what should not be done. As Marett puts it: "The observance of Tabu is the price to be paid for *mana*."¹ The rule of Tabu dominates savage life.

From this negative principle the idea of the sacred takes its rise, and this idea at the primitive level still carries with it

¹ *Vide Hibbert Journal*, October 1928, p. 68.

the implication of the dangerous. Over against objects which are dangerous stand those which are not-dangerous, and so may be handled freely. On this rudimentary basis develop the notions of the sacred and the profane. Ultimately the conception of the sacred comes to cover the whole field of religious objects and acts, and forms a note of religion itself in its working manifestation. The idea as it is thus developed is plainly a social principle. It is relevant only within a social order where rules are binding on the members, and where the interdiction of certain ways of acting has a social sanction. Through the growth of society, which expands the religious outlook, the scope and significance of the sacred are enlarged ; and with the elevation of spirits into gods the associated ideas of the pure and impure, that play so large a part in ritual religion, emerge. Even more important is the permeation of the sacred by the ethical element, which is a mark of higher religion. For the ethical

spirit liberates religion from the bondage of superstition and transforms it into a reasonable service.

So far I have endeavoured to indicate broadly, and with the omission of many details, the more characteristic features of early religion. To find any tokens here of a transcendent element would, on the surface at least, appear far-fetched and even absurd. It is evident that the transcendent in the sense of the supramundane is absent from the beginnings of man's religious history. The early religious consciousness moves within the sphere of the given world, and the worshipper and the objects worshipped alike belong to it. Only at a higher stage, when the intellectual activity and the moral will have been developed, do men contrast the external order in space and time with a superior order.

Still one can discern at the humble level of savage religion the rise of a distinction between the common and the sacred,

the world of ordinary experience and the world of religious values. A movement of selection has begun, the outcome of which is to invest the things worshipped with a strange and supernatural significance. The object or the spirit which possess *mana* is elusive and mysterious ; its working is not fully comprehended, and this separates it from the common and the ordinary. An object charged with the sacred, and so belonging to the sphere of religion, thereby becomes something apart, something beyond and above all that falls within the normal environment of life. Granted that the object of savage worship often seems to us most mean and commonplace—a stone, a claw, or an animal—yet the fact that for the savage it possesses the sacred, and so has religious value, sets it in a region apart. When the thing is judged to have somehow lost its mysterious power, it straightway becomes common, and the awe felt for it vanishes. Neither the savage nor the civilised man

can worship a being devoid of power, a being he fully understands and can perfectly control.

If we keep these facts in mind, we shall not find it hard to admit that even at its rudimentary stage the movement of religious belief is directed to something beyond the environment of common objects. Behind the universal distinction between the sacred and the not-sacred this principle is operative. To speak of this "beyond" as the transcendent would be a misnomer : it would import misleading associations into primitive religion. But at least we observe here the rude beginnings of the movement out of which the idea was gradually to grow. More than this one cannot expect in savage religion where human hopes and fears were bounded by the world of the senses. Yet this is not the whole truth. To say that in early religion we discern a movement, crude in its kind, to something beyond does not imply that objects of worship were always

felt to be remote. On the contrary man also felt drawn close to these divine powers: he believed he could enter into intimate relations with them and hold some sort of communion with them. But the other aspect is not to be forgotten. These powers were also mysterious and aloof, repelling unwarranted intrusion and protected by numerous interdictions and tabus.

The next broad stage of religious evolution is that of the polytheistic or national religions. Here the formless and indeterminate spirits or *numina* of early culture have been replaced by gods possessing a more or less defined character and specific attributes. To trace the steps by which this process worked itself out does not at present concern us. The point of importance is, that the organised life of the civic state, by extending the range and multiplying the forms of human activity, brought about a great development of human personality. This inner

development was reflected in the gods who were worshipped : they were judged to possess in an eminent degree the qualities and virtues on which man set store. The gods are wiser and more powerful than men, and the greater deities rule over departments of nature or of the social life. Hence they transcend the local limitations in which the old cult of spirits was involved. They are usually invisible to sense, removed from the world, and exercising their power from a position above it. One thinks in this connection of the Vedic gods, the Homeric pantheon, and the greater gods of Egypt and Babylonia. In some of the Babylonian hymns the transcendent power of the deity is emphasised, and of the Hebrew Jahveh it is said, " Behold the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee."

Still, it would be true to say that the national religions on the whole are too closely bound up with the political and social organisation of the State to give

marked emphasis to the transcendent side of religion. This holds alike the object of worship and the destiny of man. For if the values which bulked large in the eyes of citizens were no longer purely material, they were none the less values which lay within the given order of society: they did not directly point to a supramundane reality for their realisation. Or at least when the supramundane aspect plays a conspicuous part within a national religion, it is significant of the loosening of the tie which binds religion to the structure of the national life. It is prophetic of a further religious development.

The historic growth of religion shows us that the spirit and meaning of religion striving for fulfilment cannot be confined within the limits of the national and political idea. The growing sense of individuality, and the deepening of the personal and moral consciousness, bring about new movements—movements which break free from the existing religious

framework and introduce a larger outlook. Especially does the development of the ethical spirit lead to qualitative distinctions between the human and the divine. Such a movement is prophetic religion with its strongly marked ethical character and its stress on the value of the inner religious spirit.

The most conspicuous illustration of this new spiritual tendency is Hebrew prophetism, and we can discern points of affinity in the religion of Zarathustra. Hegel termed the religion of Israel the "Religion of Sublimity," but the epithet is more applicable to Hebrew prophecy. The vision of Jahveh "high and lifted up" breaks on Isaiah and humbles him. "Woe is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips, for mine eyes have seen the King" (vi. 5). Elsewhere he exclaims: "Behold God is great and we know him not"; "God hath upon him terrible majesty."¹ In such sayings

¹ *Vide* Isa. xxxvi. and xxxvii.

as "the heaven is his throne and the earth is his footstool," the transcendence of Jahveh is figuratively expressed. But the divine transcendence is also qualitative. The holiness of Jahveh, at this stage penetrated with ethical content, is contrasted with human sinfulness, and His eternity with human mutability. The intense ethical spirit of Hebrew prophetism conceives the Deity to be "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," and to be far removed from the sin and evil that are in the world.

The prophetic religion of Zarathustra likewise shows us how the moral consciousness exalts and ennobles the conception of the divine. The God whom the Persian prophet proclaimed has parted with the traits of an elemental deity, and is the leader in the world-wide war of right against wrong. The fundamental character of Ahura Mazda is moral. The physical world-order is derived from him, but the moral order is his peculiar concern. He rules the world from above, and is at

once the law-giver and judge. Like the Hebrew prophets Zarathustra clearly implies the divine transcendence.

The prophetic movement is usually the expression of a reaction against a formal and an external religion ; for it emphasises the supreme importance of the inward spirit and life. In keeping with this it sets forth a nobler and larger conception of the divine than was possible in a civic religion chiefly dominated by national values. Liberating religion from these limitations prophetic religion finds its goal in ethical monotheism : its sphere is the invisible world, and its appeal becomes universal. The demand it makes for trust and reliance on an invisible and transcendent being brings about a fresh expression of the religious attitude. In other words, prophetism brings faith into the foreground as a specific religious principle which expresses the way man now relates himself to God. And religious faith, as distinguished from mere belief,

points always to that which lies beyond the veil of sense.

Yet here, too, the historic religious experience teaches us that the mere emphasis on the transcendent does not finally satisfy the religious consciousness. A deity abiding "on the limit far withdrawn" does not fully meet the cravings of the soul. An illustration of this is the Islamic religion. Allah is supreme in power and majesty, an arbitrary sovereign who declares his will to his subjects and rewards and punishes with impartial justice. But he establishes no intimate contact with human life, and Islamic piety remains formal and external. The omnipotence of the all-determining divine will becomes a ground of fatalism, and this tends to neutralise spiritual endeavour. Hence the creed of Islam fails to meet the needs of the highly civilised and progressive peoples.

The history of post-exilic Judaism furnishes another illustration of the spiritual

defect of abstract transcendency. The Jew of that period looked out on an alien world which had dashed his dearest hopes, a world where evil was rampant. God seemed farther and farther withdrawn from this earthly scene, so exalted in His holiness and majesty that it became hard to think of Him entering into direct and living communication with men. God, aloof and removed afar, could only enter into relations with men through angels and intermediary spirits. Hellenistic thought, represented for example by Philo, sought to offer a philosophic justification of this attitude by accentuating the ineffable character of the One.¹ Here too the rigid severance of God from any direct and intimate contact with human souls produced a type of religion which failed to meet the urgent needs of a world longing for spiritual deliverance and help.

At the other extreme is consistent pan-

¹ λέγεσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν ἀλλὰ μόνον εἶναι τὸ ὄν. *Vide* Ritter and Preller, ed. 9, p. 492.

theism ; and if pantheism has been able to sustain and foster a genuine religious experience, it would follow that a transcendent reference is not essential to religion. But pantheism is, in the main, a speculative theory of the universe, and while religious experience may sometimes be pantheistically coloured, in the actual working of religion the pantheism is always modified. For worship and communion belong to the essence of religion, and neither is possible if the difference between the human and the divine is resolved into an identity.

As an illustration how religion cannot win a satisfying expression of itself through pantheism let us consider Hinduism. We all know that the doctrine of the Upanishads and the Vedânta is definitely pantheistic. Salvation is gained by knowledge, by knowing that the world is merely *Maya* or illusion, and by perceiving the identity of the *Atman* or self with Brahma the all-pervading essence of the universe. *Tat*

tuam asi : "That art Thou." In practice, however, this remains a gospel for the thinker and the ascetic, and the ordinary Hindu is a polytheist who gives his worship to Vishnu, Krishna, or some other deity. And even when the thinker seeks to describe the nature of Brahma, we find the element of transcendence slipping in. If he is spoken of as the all-embracing and eternal reality, it is also proclaimed that he is neither this nor that, and can be positively determined by no known concept. He is elusive, ineffable, and without qualitative predicates.

But Indian religion has another aspect. Within Hinduism itself there emerges another way of salvation, a deliverance not achieved by knowledge but through devotion and faith. Hinduism on its speculative side proclaimed deliverance through knowledge and ascetic practice, but in the doctrine of Bhakti a way of salvation is opened out where personal devotion and faith come to their due.

Hence religion assumes a warmer and more personal colouring. In that classical exposition of Bhakti, the *Bhagavad-gita*, we read the Deity said to Arguna : " I cannot be seen as you have seen me by means of the Vedas, not by penance, not by gift, nor yet by sacrifice. But, O Arguna, by devotion to me exclusively I can in this form be truly known, seen, and entered into."¹ Bhakti is the trust and devotion offered to the Bhagavat, which simply means the revered and exalted ; and different gods may be the object of Bhakti. In the *Bhagavad-gita* Vishnu plays the leading rôle as the object of faith. When Bhakti is directed to Brahma the relation of the worshipper to the worshipped assumes a living and personal character. In harmony with this the purely pantheistic conception of Brahma is tempered by insistence on his mysterious, elusive, and, we may put it, his transcendent nature. The supreme being "is devoid of all

¹ *Bhagavad-gita*, translated by Telang, p. 99.

qualities, and the enjoyer of all qualities. It is within all things and without them ; it is movable and also immovable ; it is unknown through its subtlety ; it stands afar and near.”¹

It seems worth while to lay stress on this movement within Hinduism. For it bears testimony to the fact that when religion becomes quick and intimate it tends to free itself from the notion of pure immanence, and to express itself in a way which suggests the transcendence of the object of worship.

A further illustration of the truth that a religion of salvation tends to transcendence in some form may be drawn from Buddhism. The field here would seem unpromising, for Buddhism, in its original form at least, is a gospel of salvation without a God, and without worship in the ordinary sense of the term. In its later developments no doubt it parted with its extreme negative features, and Buddha

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

himself was exalted to a divine being. At the same time, even in its original form Buddhism sets before man an ideal which may be fairly described as transcendent. Nirvana is assuredly something more than blank negation or mere extinction : it stands for a goal which lies beyond the world of sense and desire. Yet just for this reason it is elusive and defies exact definition. Buddha himself refused to speak of it in definite terms, and declined to discuss the question whether it was better described as existence or non-existence. His ideal was ineffable and transcendent, a peace which " passeth understanding," and a goal that lay beyond the reach of thought.

The highest religions are universal in their outlook and appeal : they convey a message for man as man. Further, they are greatly occupied with the problem of salvation, the deliverance of the soul from the things which fetter and depress its spiritual life. This deliverance, it is felt,

can only come through some higher means, for man as a purely natural being, swayed by lust and passion, cannot emancipate himself from the tyranny of the evil. Redemptive religion finds the best solution of its problem when it inculcates trust and faith in a Higher Power who secures the work of redemption. In practice, only when a religion is definitely theistic do men win the assurance that their craving for salvation can be met. Yet the God on whom they depend they cannot fully know, for they walk in the twilight, not in the open day. On none of the things around them can they rest in the firm confidence that it will meet their need. In this emergency faith takes the place of vision, and faith directs itself to a Reality which is transcendent. God, who is the hope of salvation, lies beyond the natural order which hems men in but is always so unsatisfying. These features are conspicuously present in Christianity, which is, beyond dispute, the highest of all religions.

The transcendent aspect of Christian theism has its roots in Jewish monotheism, and so the idea of God is free of pantheistic implications. Only a deity who is not involved in the sin and evil of the world can guarantee deliverance from it.

Nevertheless, Christian theism gives no countenance to the tendency so to separate God from the world and man that He becomes a nebulous and indeterminate Being. At the heart of the religion of Christ lies the conviction that the divine is also near, that God is not a *deus absconditus*, but a spirit who reveals Himself, and has made His mind and will manifest in a human life. On this foundation the whole structure of Christian faith and hope is built. Neither transcendence nor pantheism can satisfy the spiritual mind. Hence the Christian conception of God is that of a supreme spirit exalted above man, yet revealing Himself to man, making Himself known as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. In this respect it

offers us a just synthesis of both elements, the immanent and the transcendent. Hence the Christian religion meets the double need of the human soul as it turns to God : it is a religion which responds alike to the needs of worship and the needs of life.

Let me now try to gather up the conclusions that may be drawn from this rapid survey. If, as I hope, the facts have been presented fairly, it appears that the transcendent is a persisting factor in the historic development of religious experience. This factor sometimes stands in the foreground, and it sometimes recedes into the background, of the religious situation, but it does not vanish. Even in religious systems where the trend towards pantheism is pronounced, the religious spirit strives to break away from a doctrine of strict identity or pure immanence. No doubt at the rudimentary stage of religion the transcendent element is merely implicit and but crudely expressed in terms of the

working of the primitive mind. Still, it is foreshadowed in the sense of a mysterious power which, by its presence, separates the things which are sacred from those which are common. And as the sacred is gradually leavened by the ethical, so is the object of worship elevated above the world of ordinary facts and relations. This, to speak broadly, is the religious attitude which prevails in the national and polytheistic religions.

It is, however, when redemptive religions, appealing to man as man, emerge that there ensues a more distinct break with the natural world and its order. Suffering and sorrow are seen to be widespread, and they appear to be interwoven with the conditions of mundane existence. So salvation as deliverance takes a deeper meaning. It is now something more than the liberation from this or that obstacle which hampers the will : it becomes a cry for a salvation which will emancipate the soul from the constant

tyranny of sense and passion. When it is realised that the natural powers cannot achieve this deliverance, the soul is impelled to look beyond itself, and to fix its faith and hope in a supramundane Power and a transcendent world.¹

At its highest levels religion is permeated by the feeling of the unsatisfying character of the given world, and turns from it to a goal beyond. It knows that "the world and the desire thereof pass away," and it must "set its affections on things above." This reaction from the world of common experience, issuing in a movement of the soul to the supramundane and eternal, is a feature of spiritual religion. If this be foolishness to the "natural man" whose needs are bounded by material goods, it is the meaning of faith to those who have felt the breath of the spirit. Some idealists tell us that what we call the "other world" is just the

¹ This is a point on which Eucken has laid stress. *Vide* his *Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, pp. 173 ff.

inner meaning and ideal truth of this world. This is a speculative theory, and it has to justify itself, if it can do so, on speculative grounds. But I think the higher religious life of mankind cannot be fairly fitted into such a scheme, and religions of salvation and religions of faith cannot be construed on these terms.

If men could win deliverance simply by seeing more deeply into the present order and adjusting themselves to it, the upward flight of faith would be superfluous. At the same time the gospel of world-denial does not suffice. The soul's retreat from this world to find its good not Here but Yonder is not free from the taint of selfishness. To deny the world is only half the truth, and asceticism is not the whole rule of life. The higher religious consciousness has a positive side ; and if this world is unsatisfying, in the end it is God's world and not abandoned to evil powers. Men feel there is some disclosure of the divine even in the things of sense, and the

soul recognises it is in contact with God in the life of spiritual endeavour. Expressed in theological language this is the doctrine of divine grace. And though we may differ about the theological doctrine, the fact of the experience is sure : it is attested by a " cloud of witnesses."

The consciousness of grace is inexplicable if there be not some truth in the doctrine of immanence. Those who proclaim that transcendence is the whole truth should in consistency regard grace given to the soul as a superstitious belief, and this Kant, for example, was inclined to do. The sympathetic student of religion, however, will not rule out an impressive body of religious experience in this arbitrary fashion ; he will rather regard it as a factor in religion which calls for a discerning interpretation. It is just this twofold movement of the religious spirit whereby it affirms a God exalted above the world and yet active within the world which is a chief problem of a theistic philosophy of

religion. The problem is set by religious experience. And what is true of grace is also true of revelation. Here too we are dealing with an inner experience whose source is claimed to be divine. The gift comes from above, but the illuminating power is felt within. This is not explicable if a doctrine of divine transcendence is taken to be final and sufficient.

LECTURE II

THE WORLD-ORDER AND THE TRANSCENDENT

Growth of idea of order in phenomena. The natural order contrasted with the supernatural. Various notions of meaning of miracle. The religious question at issue defined. Conceptions of natural law, uniformity of nature, and causal nexus examined. Nature not shown to exclude a transcendent Causality. The significance of human freedom. Not explained by naturalism. The moral order is teleological. It postulates a chief End and a transcendent Good. Conclusion: the natural order does not exclude, and the moral order demands, the transcendent.

LECTURE II

THE WORLD-ORDER AND THE TRANSCENDENT

WITH the growth of human intelligence the idea of an order in things steadily developed. A knowledge of the usual conjunction of events was necessary to prevision, and to know what to expect, and to be prepared for it, were in the interests of life. Long before men had advanced to the general conception of the uniformity of nature they habitually acted on the assumption that fire would always burn and water drown. Reflection on the constant connection of events in the external world led to the idea of an order of occurrences which could be relied on, and these uniformities came to be described as laws which ruled in nature. Finally, scientific thinking formulated the

principle that everything which happened in nature must be explicated in terms of the laws that operated within it.

From one point of view religion had no quarrel with this principle. The religious man simply referred the uniformity of nature to a divine cause or ground. But from another point of view a difficulty came to be felt. For though God, the supreme cause, was the ultimate ground of all events within the order of nature, He was also believed to work in special ways on nature, in ways which were commonly called supernatural. And the problem arose how, if all external events were to be directly explained through natural laws, any event in the outer world could be referred to the direct and immediate operation of the Deity. In the interests of the doctrine of a Special Providence it was urged that at points there must be room for divine intervention, and as a matter of fact there were events which the laws of nature could not explain.

These were directly due to divine agency. The contention in brief was, that the course of nature could not be so ordered that it did not afford scope for supernatural events which could be traced to the immediate action of God.

On various grounds this claim has not been hospitably entertained by the scientific mind. It meant a concession which seemed to cast doubt on the mode of explanation which had served science so well. And the scientist was quite entitled to draw attention to the fact that by his method many occurrences, once deemed supernatural, had been scientifically explained. On the other hand, it was just as plain that the religious mind believed, when it put forward this demand, that a serious issue was at stake. For many were much concerned to maintain the reality of the miracles which were associated with historical Christianity. Further, they were very apprehensive lest God should be excluded from direct

action on His world, since that seemed to nullify faith in a special providence. God, it was argued, acts directly on souls, and, in view of the intimate relation of man and nature, it seemed illegitimate to deny His like direct action on the world. Moreover, to bring divine acting entirely within the sphere of law seemed to eliminate its ethical and personal character. Therefore, while the order of nature was due to its constant dependence on a divine ground, in the interests of religion one must be free to hold that specific cases of divine intervention occurred whereby the natural order was modified. In effect this was a demand that at definite points in the physical order a transcendent cause might intervene, and in certain cases had no doubt so intervened.

Science, we have just said, has usually been critical of this claim, for it seemed to strike at the roots of scientific procedure which has always presupposed the constancy of natural laws. Some theologians,

notably those who have laid stress on the divine immanence, have sided with science on this point. They have argued that the laws of nature are the constant expression of the divine will ; and if God were to suspend or modify these laws, He would really be contradicting Himself. God cannot do and undo His work in this fashion. The argument rests on a refusal to recognise a distinction in significance and function between mediate and immediate divine activity.

On the other hand, the pious mind has always inclined to the belief that if there were miracles, or immediate divine actings, in the sphere of grace, there might well be miracles in the realm of nature. Though all things in nature depend on God, some occurrences appear to reveal His acting more directly than others. For God is a spirit, and His personal acting cannot be measured in terms of impersonal law. So it is contended ; but I do not intend to enter into the

details of the vexed question of miracles. The discussion has never been very conclusive, and it has suffered from the lack of precision and consistency in the use of terms. In an age of historical criticism and comparative study of religions the situation is seen in an altered perspective, and to-day miracles have not the same importance for us that they had for an older generation of apologists. It has become plain that to infer spiritual truths from physical miracles is an inadmissible *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. While the more closely the pleas for a given miracle are scrutinised, the clearer does it grow that in the recognition of miracle as such faith is involved.

Yet when all this has been conceded frankly a real problem remains, and one which is of serious import to religion. It is the problem whether God, conceived to be transcendent, can or cannot act immediately within the given physical order. The issue is merely evaded by

retaining miracle in the sense of the wonderful, while rejecting it in the sense of the supernatural. Thomas Aquinas, whose discussion of the matter is illuminating, distinguishes between subjective and objective miracles, that is, between events which were wonderful to us and events which were incapable of explanation in terms of the natural order. Schleiermacher emphasised the same point when he differentiated the *mirabile* from the *miraculum*. At the same time he argued that it was not necessary in a religious interest to assert the reality of a *miraculum*. In other words, there is no religious call to take any event out of its context in the natural order. It is enough that the event should be regarded by the mind as a spiritually significant sign of divine activity.

Some Ritschlian theologians adopt the same view : they lay stress on the religious value an event has for the believing mind, and take that to be the essence of miracle.

Consequently they do not challenge the right of science to interpret the occurrence in its own way, and to offer its own explanation of it. I do not think that Leibniz's theory of miracle as a wonderful event predetermined from the first in the divine order of the world, and appearing in its due time and place, is actually different. For his view does not really distinguish a miracle from any other event which occurs within the context of nature, where everything which happens falls into its place in a determinate order of development.

It is not difficult to understand the motives which led to this subjective interpretation of miracle. The testimony for the steady uniformity of natural happenings is no doubt great, and is the ground of our reliance on the physical order. This reliance is essential to human life. It is indeed fallacious to contend, as Hume did, that the balance of evidence in favour of the constancy of nature must always far

outweigh and prevail against any testimony to the contrary. Mere quantity of evidence sometimes proves a precarious guide. Moreover, human experience is growing and plastic, and the experience of what has been cannot determine what may or may not be. A new scientific discovery may modify any day previous conclusions drawn from experience.¹ None the less, the testimony of experience will always count for something : it at least establishes a probability, and the probabilities of the case will lead the dispassionate mind to be critical of claims in favour of an objective miracle.

Then there are always the possibilities of misinterpretation of the facts, and of mistaken inferences from them, to reckon with. Besides, there is a further difficulty

¹ To say, as has been said, that Hume's argument only applies to the violation of the laws of nature is not to the point. For him a law of nature can only be the embodiment of a series of experiences cemented by psychical association. Hence Hume's use of the word "violation" is not strictly in harmony with his own premises.

of which we are bound to take account. Granted that the facts which are regarded as miraculous happened just in the way they are reported to have happened ; even so, how are we to be sure that a natural explanation of them is not possible ? A negative is always hard to prove. In this case it could only be proved, if our knowledge of nature was so exhaustive that we were able to say the event in question could not have been naturally produced. Those who urge this plea usually point out how the sphere of explanation has been steadily extended in the past, and further knowledge has brought many events at one time reckoned supernatural within the natural order. It would appear, therefore, we are never entitled to affirm with absolute certainty that any specific event is a miracle in the objective sense of the word. The possibility at least, if not the probability, of a natural explanation is always present.

Though faced with these difficulties,

theists have usually declined to commit themselves to the conclusion that the *miraculum* is only the *mirabile* which is associated with a religious value. The religious value, it is evident, cannot be sustained by a purely subjective impression, and implies an objective meaning ; and if the postulated objective meaning is recognised to be unjustifiable, the value of the event for the religious mind will vanish. Or, at most, it will have just the same value as all other events within the mundane order which are ultimately dependent on God.¹ None the less the man who affirms the objective truth of supernatural divine working within the physical order does so by an act of faith : it is not possible to prove the claim in the scientific sense of the word "proof." But in ordinary life we continually act, and cannot help acting, on beliefs which are

¹ There is a tendency on the part of those who accept only subjective miracles to attribute to them more than a subjective value. *Vide* Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity*, p. 14.

not susceptible of strict proof, and faith of this kind is practically justified. This is notably the case in all that concerns the future. Of course any specific exercise of faith in this way would be illegitimate were it shown that it contradicted assured knowledge. But when this is not so, then practical considerations ought to have weight.

In the particular problem we are discussing the point at issue takes this form : Is our scientific knowledge of nature such that we are entitled to say that the direct operation of a transcendent Cause within the order of nature must be definitely excluded ? To put it otherwise : Is our scientific insight into the immanent causal working of the system of nature a sufficient ground for declaring that within this ordered whole there is no room for the activity of a supramundane Cause ? If science is in a position to assert this, religion will not be at liberty to postulate something which contradicts it. Let us

consider therefore the scientific interpretation of nature, that we may discover what it gives us ground for affirming and for denying.

The first point to discuss is the meaning and validity of the concept of natural laws. These laws were usually supposed to determine the course of events, and each single event was taken to illustrate and express the operation of a law. Thus every falling body, in its direction and acceleration, exemplifies the law of gravitation. At one time it was usual to speak of such laws as inviolable, and any claim to violate them was at once pronounced inadmissible. On these premises miracle was a contradiction. If you accept this statement of the case, it becomes futile to plead that the supernatural may be an expression of a higher natural law. For in effect this sacrifices the supernatural character of the event, and treats it as a naturally determined fact. If religion is interested in saving the supernatural, it

cannot do it in this way. The premises will have to be revised.

Now in recent years the older conception of natural law has been much criticised, and a good deal of the criticism has come from scientific thinkers. The analogy of human law, it is pointed out, is quite misleading. We are, for example, not entitled to speak of a law of nature as a kind of independent principle ruling phenomena by its own inherent rights. The parallel of mathematical law—say the expansion of a series where each element in the whole is definitely determined—cannot be transferred to nature. For the premises are purely abstract, and are not to be identified with physical data.

The truth—and it is now widely recognised—is that laws of nature are not principles in themselves: they are primarily descriptions. They simply stand for observed uniformities which have been generalised in a convenient form. Their descriptive and general character is

emphasised by the fact that in extreme instances they do not hold with perfect accuracy. For example, the Newtonian law of gravitation is not precisely true when bodies are moving with a very high velocity, nor is the law relating the volume of a gas to the pressure on it absolutely constant in limiting cases. Consequently we are not justified in saying that any exception to a so-called law must be contradictory : all that follows is that the generalisation is not perfectly accurate.

Natural science, in striving to formulate conveniently the observations of natural processes, has established for its use a large number of laws which represent empirical uniformities. On this basis it has advanced to a general principle which has been extended to the whole realm of physical phenomena. This principle is familiarly known as the uniformity of nature. The principle shares the character of the empirical laws from which it has been developed : it is a comprehensive

generalisation resting ultimately on observation. There is no warrant for regarding it as a necessary or axiomatic truth, and its certainty is no greater than the degree in which it has been verified by experience. It is indeed the premise on which inductive inference depends, and hence induction yields only probability, it may be a high degree of probability, yet not certainty. There is no contradiction in the thought that the working of nature is not perfectly uniform. The uniformity which has been observed in nature may make us critical of supposed events which are not in harmony with it, but it gives us no right to proclaim the events to be impossible. The abstract necessity which characterises a mathematical deduction cannot be transferred to physical occurrences.

The debate on the supernatural cannot then be settled by an appeal to natural laws. For those who affirm or deny the possibility of supernatural intervention within the spatial and temporal order the

real problem centres in the nature of causal nexus. Is the relation of cause and effect such that every external event appearing within the physical order can only be explained by a natural cause or causes operating within that order? If B emerges within a given physical context, are we justified in holding that there is one element A within that context to which it is necessarily related as its cause? Were the causal relation reducible to an identity, were it right to say, as Hegel said, that cause and effect are the same thing twice put, we should be committed to this conclusion. But this reduction is not possible, and is contradicted by the element of difference in the effect without which the relation would not be recognisable as a causal relation. In transeunt causality, with which we are at present concerned, the element of change is always involved. Moreover, if *causa aequat effectum*, we have summarily to rule out a plurality of causes for the same effect.

Nor is the problem solved by the theory of Kant that B must follow A in an invariable order in time owing to the epistemological principle by which we organise experience. For mind cannot impose necessity on a matter of experience which is not in the end dependent on mind ; and, moreover, the epistemological rule is typical and general, and it cannot constitute the specific and concrete conjunctions of actual phenomena.

Nothing seems so simple and natural as the relation of cause and effect if we are content to ask no questions about it ; but when we begin to subject it to scrutiny and analysis, it becomes in a high degree baffling and elusive. Lotze used to point out that the supposed passage of force from the cause over into the effect is altogether mysterious. Some physicists are now disposed to discard the idea of force as anthropomorphic, and to construe the causal relation merely as a functional correspondence between variables. If so,

the functional correspondence, which is the generalised statement of a relation, cannot be construed as a principle which lends any intrinsic necessity to the sequence of physical events. For the correspondence is expressed in a form which is abstract, typical, and general, and it tells us nothing about the specific connection between the physical data. Obviously it can confer no necessity on these factual relations beyond what may be already there. Yet the idea of an intrinsic necessity between natural occurrents lies behind the conception of an inviolable order in things ; and this conception we must examine more closely.

When we use the word " necessary " we presuppose the presence of conditions which necessitate : an absolute and unconditioned being could not strictly be termed necessary—it could only be said to exist. Two events A and B, which we call cause and effect, are found conjoined in experience ; nevertheless, they

do not contain in themselves the ground or explanation *why* they are so conjoined. The presumed necessity by which they mutually determine one another can only be found, if it can be found at all, within the wider context in which they appear. In practice, however, science finds itself constrained to ignore a great deal in this larger field of implications, and confines itself to a narrow and selected aspect of it. Otherwise the problem would become unmanageable. But by selecting and abstracting in this way science sacrifices any claim to adequate explanation. The scientist, if he is to reach definite conclusions, cannot avoid disregarding the background of the situation, and treating it as irrelevant to his purpose ; but that it is in the long run irrelevant we cannot suppose. Yet if the conditions which are implied in a given causal sequence can only be partially and imperfectly stated, to predicate necessity of the sequence is only hypothetical. The conditions which

would enable us to infer a complete determination are not given. That a specific effect is due to a specific cause is a working assumption of science, not an *a priori* necessity ; and the assumption comes of the need of finding some continuity between the events of our experienced world.

Transeunt causality, with which we are here dealing, denotes the sequence of events within a context, or as Mr. Johnson puts it in his *Logic*, in reference to a continuant. But the factual connection remains hypothetical : one can only say that, if certain conditions, positive and negative, are given, a specific cause will have a specific effect and vice versa. To turn this hypothetical into a categorical necessity we should require to expand our restricted outlook indefinitely, we should in the end have to show that the given connection of events was determined by the systematic whole of things. But science has no such insight into the

structure of reality. Between mathematical abstractions and physics a chasm exists, and by equations it is only possible to interpret certain restricted aspects of a physical situation. Natural science deals with what can be measured, and leaves the qualitative differences of things out of the picture. To show that the separate colours of the spectrum imply quantitative differences in the length of light-waves is important ; but this leaves quite unexplained the specific quality of the *sensum* red as distinguished from the *sensum* violet. Moreover, owing to its exclusive pre-occupation with the general and typical, science can never reach what is individual and unique. Thus in the region of historical phenomena the strictly scientific method is inapplicable. But these points are familiar, and it is perhaps needless to emphasise them.

Science to-day is disposed to make a very frank confession of its limitations, and admits the inadequacy of its method

fully to explain the concrete world. Creative synthesis and new emergent qualities revealed in the evolutionary process are admitted to lie beyond the reach of mechanistic explanation. And the quantum theory of our time has in view phenomena in the natural order which contradict the classical mechanics, and are even subversive of traditional causal conceptions. In fact, the recent developments of mathematical physics are so radical that the old conception of nature is being transformed. So-called solid matter has vanished, and gravitation has been reduced to the metric properties of the space-time continuum in electrical fields.¹ How far these results are assured a layman will not presume to judge ; but he finds it comforting to note that materialism has received

¹ "An ideal shines in front of us, far ahead perhaps but irresistible, that the whole of our knowledge of the physical world may be unified into a single science, which will perhaps be expressed in terms of geometrical or quasi-geometrical conceptions."—Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 136.

a deadly wound in the house of those who were once its friends.

The point I wish to press home here is the inadequacy of mechanism as an interpretation of nature. The idea of mechanism itself is a mental picture or pattern which has been read into the natural order. The mechanistic scheme has lent support to the idea that nature is a closed system in which every event is determined by its relation to other events, and ultimately by the whole, of which it is an element. A necessity which is only hypothetical is converted into a categorical, not, however, as the result of analysis, but by the assumption that nature is a mechanical system of mutually determining and determined elements. This assumption we are not entitled to make, but unless we make it we have no right to proclaim the inflexible necessity of the natural order. There may well be an element of contingency at the heart of things, and the constancy based on statistics is quite compatible

with a degree of spontaneity in the units.

Moreover, as we have already noted, the idea of necessity reveals its limitations under scrutiny.¹ Pursue it far enough and you reach the notion of the simply existent, even as the process of rationalising ends with unrationalised data. We conclude, therefore, that the conception of nature as a closed and rigidly determined system is an unverified hypothesis for which there is no sufficient evidence. Accordingly the contention that no supernatural causality can manifest itself within the context of nature fails.

But if the possibility of transcendent activity within the world-order is left open, it is important that we should not conceive this activity in a way that creates doubts and provokes objections. Statements of theologians on this point have often been unguarded and sometimes unwise. To say, for example, that God suspends the

¹ *Vide* Sigwart, *Logic* (Eng. trans.), vol. ii, p. 118.

order of nature in order to work His purpose is surely a provocative statement, and is open to the reply that nature always seems to work uniformly. What evidence is there of any such suspension?

A like objection may be urged against the view that a miracle denotes an event taken out of its natural context and exclusively due to a transcendent cause. For no event can be really isolated in this fashion, and every event must stand in relation to the operative factors of the situation within which it appears. Were it otherwise the event would be meaningless rather than supernatural. But we are under no obligation to conceive divine activity to be exercised in this way. Natural causes need not be suppressed, but the transcendent ground of nature may modify, intensify, or supplement their working, so that it would still be true to say that events may happen within the natural order which that order of itself could not produce. The physical context would thus continue

to be a contributing factor in producing the result, though not itself the sufficient reason of the result. Here of course we must admit that, with the knowledge at our disposal, we cannot prove there are no resources in nature which could of themselves bring about the event.

It may be objected here that we are merely replacing one hypothesis by another, for divine action in the form suggested cannot be proved. In the strict sense of proof this is true, but something analogous can be shown to take place : I mean the causality of the human will within the order of nature. This cannot be interpreted in terms of naturalism. No doubt naturalistic thinkers have judged otherwise : they have resisted the tendency to set man on a pedestal apart, and have sought to bring him entirely within their own scheme. Man, we have been told, is as rigidly determined in his acting as in the course of a stone falling down a hill. The erratic movements of the descending

stone no more argue freedom in the stone than the actings of human beings argue freedom in man. Motives are only forces the strongest of which determines action, and Hobbes has assured us that the will is only "the last appetite in deliberating."

To refute these assertions is hardly necessary, and I doubt if they would be seriously urged by many at present. Indeed, there is a general disposition to admit that the phenomena of consciousness and volition transcend explanation through the principles of mechanical action. Motives are not external forces, and will is not propulsion by a *vis a tergo*. Human purpose and natural determination are different in kind : man determines himself, while a thing is determined *ab extra*. In fact, in the sphere of self-conscious will the principle of natural causality is in a way reversed : here we have not a backward but a forward-looking causality, the causality of ends and motives. Over against the realm of nature stands the

realm of Ends, to use the terminology of the late Prof. Ward, and the attempts to explain the higher order in terms of the lower have never succeeded. For if the higher order emerges on the basis of the lower and uses it, it transcends and transforms the lower. The pattern of action which is called mechanical cannot adequately interpret the facts of the living organism, and it fails even more conspicuously to interpret the active and self-conscious mind. Indeed, on the principles of pure naturalism, consciousness is a phenomenon which fulfils no useful function, and it is a mystery why it should be there at all.

If free and self-determined action is a fact, a fact which naturalism can neither explain nor explain away, it is surely important to consider the light which this casts upon the order of nature on which human activity supervenes. Plainly the natural order must not be conceived in a way which would exclude action within it

of a form of causality which is not merely natural. As an illustration let me recall the theory of Kant. Those familiar with his work will remember the stress he lays on the reality of freedom, for freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law. On the other hand, he so conceives the phenomenal order in space and time that he really leaves no room for a higher causality to operate within that order. The order of things is indeed supposed to be constituted by the nature of the cognising subject : its pattern is woven by mind. But it is an order in which events have an invariable and necessary sequence, and each event is understood and explained by its relation to other events within the determined sequence in space and time.

We are not helped by being told that this natural order is merely phenomenal, and is grounded in the noumenal. For there seems no point at which a transcendent cause can insert itself into the web of necessary connections in the phenomenal

sphere. In other words, though the whole phenomenal order depends on a transcendent ground, each single event within that order must be treated as exclusively conditioned by its natural context.

The situation is not changed by supposing these necessary connections are determined by the cognising mind. There is no room for a free causality bringing about phenomenal effects. The difficulty is not removed when we are told that, although man is phenomenally bound, he is noumenally free. After all, it is for his phenomenal actions that he is judged responsible. Kant's epistemology involved him in this dilemma. It will not face us if we take our stand on the position that cause and effect are not an identity, that intrinsic necessity cannot be proved to hold within the order of nature, and that this order is simply the expression of a uniformity which rests entirely on experience.

If this be so, the action of man upon nature involves no contradiction, although

it means the activity within nature of a causality not explicable in terms of nature. The uniform acting of nature is in no way suspended, but is only modified. If a man lifts a weight from the ground, gravitation is not annulled, though its operation is qualified by an activity which is not explicable by the principles of mechanism. When the will brings about an occurrence in the external world, the occurrence is not taken out of its context in nature : the factors which operate in that context continue to operate, and so to play their part in the interpretation of the event. But in themselves they do not suffice to account for it. In fact, no human act would be intelligible apart from co-operating elements in the situation : the error lies in supposing that these elements are the complete ground of the act. I cannot see therefore that in the face of patent facts it is possible to maintain that nature is a mechanically determined whole impervious to agency

of a higher kind. The one way to establish this conclusion would be to show that human conduct is mechanically determined, and every attempt of the kind has hopelessly broken down. Any theory which treats the consciousness of freedom as a sheer illusion, and dismisses the plain testimony of experience as a thing of no account, has no claim to a respectful hearing. Naturalism is superficially plausible, just because it takes for granted that man is a purely natural product.

One would not wish to rate the foregoing argument for more than it is worth. It certainly can yield no absolute assurance that any given event within the order of nature is directly due to divine agency. But it does go to show that some stereotyped objections to the supernatural are not convincing. The world-order cannot be reduced to a simple pattern of which mechanism is the type, and its uniformity is not exclusive of the causality of free initiative within it. This may serve to

suggest that the natural and supernatural are not exclusive orders, but that both are interwoven in the texture of human experience. Indeed, natural and supernatural are terms which must be related to one another if they are to have any meaning. They stand for two levels of experience which can be distinguished but not entirely separated. In fact, we may say that an empirical generalisation, like the uniformity of nature, does not rule out the possibility that there may be an element of spontaneity and contingency at the heart of nature.

So far our discussion has dealt mainly with the world-order in its so-called natural aspect. But the term world-order can mean more than the order of nature : it may be taken to include the mundane activities of man. In this sense we speak of the moral world-order which we distinguish from the natural order. And, as I have tried to indicate, the penetration of the natural order by the moral activity

of man shows the inner consistency of the two orders. I shall now try to show that the moral order makes the positive postulate of the transcendent.

At this point I shall not follow Kant in postulating the transcendent on the ground that it is demanded by freedom and moral obligation. I shall rather follow the teleological working of the moral life, and seek to show that it leads simply and inevitably for its own justification to the thought of the transcendent. That is to say, the moral order, in its practical issues, points beyond itself. Out of the experienced facts of the moral life there arise demands which belie the assumption that the ethical order is a purely mundane affair. They point to the conclusion that the moral life is charged with a deeper meaning than can be realised under earthly and temporal conditions. Morality lives by the tension between the ideal and the actual. In its form, therefore, it can never be complete, and looks to a goal unrealised.

Were the actual and the ideal to coalesce, moral endeavour would lose its meaning.

The moral realm, it is not disputed, is a realm of ends and values. Experienced differences in feeling-values are developed by the generalising activity of thought into a body of value-judgments which express the ideas of good in the individual and the community. These stand for ends which are objects of human endeavour and for principles of practical guidance. But when ends appear to conflict, when a decision must be taken whether this or that has the greater value, men are inevitably driven to develop a standard of value in the light of which they can arrange and systematise their values. Hence emerges the conception of a supreme value or ideal, a chief end which is the end of all other ends. Such an ideal is required to give that meaning and consistency to life which depend on putting the best things in the foremost place.

That the process thus outlined is always,

or even usually, explicit in human consciousness we do not affirm. On the other hand, the idea of a chief good, the thought of what is best in life, is involved in the conduct of ordinary people, and practically, even if obscurely, goes to influence their decisions and direct their actions. This teleological character is a feature of a self-conscious life, and lifts it above the life of mere instinct. It is implied in moral progress which is bound up with freedom.

A character of value-judgments which seek to define the good is their claim to objectivity. The good is always asserted and put forward as valid. No doubt this claim to truth may not maintain itself, and a man may discover that what he once took to be his good was not really so. Hence he is driven to revise his valuations in the light of a more adequate standard. The trouble is that our standards seem to fluctuate, and to become relative to the values operative in the historic process.

This is true even when the standard is recognised to be an ideal good, for the ideal seems to change with the changes of historic development ; and it must be so, for the ideal to become concrete has to draw its content from the existing experience of the good. As this experience at any given stage is partial, we cannot affirm that the emergent ideal will remain for ever unaffected by fresh fluctuations of the historic life, and approve itself final.

Are we then to fall back frankly on the principle of relativity ? Shall we say that one good is only to be defined over against another, and that what seems best is simply best in relation to existing circumstances ? The penalty of this would be that the whole system of valuations becomes unstable : we have no assurance that what we take to be best is really best, or that anything we believe to be good is good in more than a temporary and provisional way. This line of thought, consistently followed out, can only end in a radical

moral scepticism which would cripple the moral consciousness. For the moral spirit could never "strive and thrive" were it condemned to treat its values and ideals as shifting appearances, forming and fading with the ever-changing historic scene. Just as religion postulates a God who is real, so does morality demand an ideal which is real : with both reality is the nerve which gives working-value to the object.

At this point we pause to ask whether the difficulty may not be due to the fact that morality is not the complete and final form of the life of the spirit. The moral life takes the form of a partial but progressive realisation of the good in time. *Sub specie temporis* the ultimate goal can neither be perfectly represented nor completely achieved, yet it must be real if the meaning and value of moral endeavour are to be conserved. Hence the ultimate ideal or good cannot be stated under the form of the moral life which is a progress in time : if it is to be final

and absolute it must lie beyond the time-process. For mundane and temporal ideals cannot escape the doom of relativity. But when we speak of the Good as eternal, we do not mean mere quantitative endurance. We rather denote what is qualitatively superior to the temporal, a Good which does not change with the passing fashions of this world, but is final and fully satisfying. This transcendent Good is a postulate of the moral life, the outcome of its demand that the ultimate value which gives guidance and inspiration to its endeavour shall be real and absolute. This reference to the transcendent is not a deduction but a demand, yet it is a postulate which is reasonable in a broad sense, for it gives coherence and stability to the moral order. The alternative is a moral scepticism which practical conduct contradicts.

Hence we may summarise our results by saying that the natural world-order does not exclude the agency of a transcen-

dent Cause within it, and the moral world-order demands a transcendent Good above it. The two orders are not at variance, for they come together in human experience. But what the natural order leaves open becomes a positive postulate of the moral order.

LECTURE III

THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE TRANSCENDENT

The wider outlook of philosophy. The transcendent and idea of systematic unity. Views of mind which exclude transcendency examined. Vindication of central place of mind in organisation of experience. Type of idealism which eliminates the transcendent examined. The better way—the regress from the many to the One. The transcendent and teleology illustrated from Plato, Leibniz, and Kant. The relation of mundane to supra-mundane order. The idea of creation. The true meaning of immanence. Faith and the transcendent. The transcendent cannot be deduced, but is not irrational. It is demanded by man's moral and spiritual life.

LECTURE III

THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE TRANSCENDENT

WE have seen that the transcendent is implied in the working of the religious and the moral consciousness. It has also appeared that the scientific view of the world and the world-order at least does not preclude the existence of a transcendent order. But the limitations of the purely scientific standpoint debar any solution of the problem on scientific lines. The situation is changed, however, when the restricted outlook of science widens into the synoptic view of philosophy. For philosophy, whether successfully or not, strives to achieve a comprehensive vision of the whole and of the parts within the whole. The question therefore arises, if, from the speculative point of view, there

is any justification for the belief that the spatial and temporal order, with the facts and experiences which fall within it, are not the whole of reality. Can philosophy offer any justification for the faith, that there is a realm which transcends the mundane form of experience and is therefore not reducible to it? If so, it will lend support to what is suggested by religious and moral experience.

The philosophic mind is not commonly inclined to accept this conclusion without demur, and the reason is not far to seek. For the method of philosophy does not radically differ from that of science: it seeks to rationalise, though it does so from a comprehensive view which includes in its scope the knowing mind as well as the objects of knowledge. But for thought, which strives towards a systematic unity, the question of the reality of the non-rational and of the discontinuous can only be entertained as a problem, and cannot be accepted as a presupposition,

And if the transcendent in the full sense of the word is real, then the completeness of a strictly rational system is excluded. The transcendent implies a limit to rational deduction, and it marks the presence of a discontinuity ; and if thought in its logical movement could overpass the barrier, there would in the end be no transcendent but only the one inclusive system of rationally connected parts. Transcendency, therefore, and completeness of system are not reconcilable. Most thinkers would admit that this completeness will always be an ideal, yet some at least will urge that they cannot *in limine* endorse any postulate that the ideal is intrinsically incapable of being realised. The reply lies to hand that one must judge speculation by its fruits, and every attempt at a final synthesis has broken down.

In its actual working philosophy like science is faced with unrationalised data ; and however far the rationalising process may go, there is no warrant for asserting

that the non-rational will vanish. No doubt it does not follow that what is not rationalised is non-rational, but the fact that the activity of reason causes the limit to recede is no ground for saying that the finite mind will not always be confronted by a limit. At the same time it is inevitable that we should seek some justification for accepting the reality of the transcendent, and it is important to recognise the kind of justification which is possible. It cannot, as we know, take the form of logical demonstration.

If we say that faith in the transcendent is reasonable, the word "reasonable" must bear a very broad meaning. It will signify no more than that the postulate of the transcendent gives a more coherent and consistent view of the whole facts of experience than a doctrine of pure immanence. The postulate, in other words, represents a principle in virtue of which man gains a more satisfying outlook on experience and life. It would indeed

fail of this were the transcendent itself fundamentally irrational in the sense of the incoherent and contradictory. But to transcend reason is not to contradict it, and the mundane and the supramundane may be embraced in the divine meaning of the whole.

When we speak of the mundane order we think of the order in space and time within which we live. And it may be asked whether, in the light of recent scientific thought, we are free to take the spatial and temporal order to be valid, and to contrast it with a higher order. So far as the modern theory of Relativity is concerned, I do not think it really affects our problem. The theory treats space and time for metric purposes as a single continuum. There is no such thing as absolute position or unique distance between points. All quantitative estimates vary with the frame of reference, and are modified if the observer judges himself at rest or in motion. But the theory only

substitutes another interpretation of the external world in its quantitative aspects for the traditional one, and cannot dispense with constants. The standpoint in the end is a restricted one, and does not necessarily raise metaphysical issues. The relativity of space-time measurements does not imply that space and time are fictions, or that there is no difference between them. Extensity and duration are psychological experiences, and they remain the psychological basis from which conceptual space-time has been developed ; while the unique direction and the irreversible character of the time-series are not in dispute.

Metric properties as well as quantitative relations are only one aspect of the world, and tell us nothing of the nature of the entities which are the condition of measurement. The nature of the atom and its constituents still remains a problem, and there is the more fundamental problem of the relation of the cognising mind to its

objects. Here the issue is of crucial importance for the doctrine of transcendence. For if mind is only an entity like other entities within the world-order, the significance of the distinction between the two orders disappears, and the transcendent falls away.

This appears to be the position of Prof. Whitehead, who denies to mind any position of privilege within the world-order. In his view the ultimate constituents of reality are world-events, and spatio-temporal unities. Mind is only a more stable complex or pattern of events, a route where various "occasions" exhibit a community of type. The same, however, would be true of a so-called bit of matter.¹ For Whitehead the "passage of events" is fundamental, but he finds it necessary, in order to rescue events from mere indeterminateness and to explain the

¹*Religion in the Making*, pp. 108-9. Cp. also B. Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 156. "Mind is merely a cross-section in a stream of physical causation."

existence of stable types and patterns, to posit a principle of determination and concretion in the universe. This is reminiscent of Plato, and he calls this principle God.¹ The drift of Whitehead's argument in his most recent writings appears to point to monism, and it is perfectly clear that the Kantian contrast of phenomenal and noumenal is alien to his point of view. It is important therefore to ask if he is right in denying any special status to the cognising mind.

To say that mind is only an entity like other entities within the objective order leads to the conclusion that the world of the ordinary, or, if you like, the scientific consciousness, is in no way mind-dependent. This is hard to maintain. It is difficult to suppose that the growth of thought, mediated by language and inter-subjective intercourse, has played no part

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 250. Cp. also the rather cryptic utterances on the significance of God in *Religion in the Making*, pp. 119-20 and 150-9.

in shaping the fashion of the world in which we live and act. How else can we explain the difference of the world of the dog and that of man? Then it is surely impossible to deny that the space and time of the physicist are elaborate conceptual products, the fruit of a long generalising activity. Nor would our constant reference of attributes to substances, of effects to causes, and of means to ends, have come into being apart from the living experiences of the active mind. There would be no values read into objects if there were no subjects who had an inner experience of value.¹

These are all processes which go to shape the human world-view; and the conceptual world, the world of public experience, could never have emerged apart from the synthetic activity of mind. Simply to construe the self as a complex

¹ In the works previously referred to Whitehead appears to assume that value may belong to an objective structure apart from any reference to the valuing subject.

pattern of events is to ignore its unique contribution to the organisation of experience. In the long run the cognising subject can never be placed on the same level as the spatio-temporal object. The reduction of all experience to a single order is not to be achieved, if it is to be achieved, at the expense of reducing the cognising mind to an entity, more complex of course, but still of essentially the same status as other entities, within that order.

There is, indeed, another side to this problem, and it has to be faced frankly. Can you suppose, it may be asked, that our minds constitute what is termed the objective order of things? Can you maintain, with Kant, that the mind introduces into the representation which stands for nature the order it finds there? Plainly weighty objections may be urged against such a conclusion. It is impossible to show that the cognising subject could impose its own principles on an unrelated manifold of sense-data which on one side depend on

something other than mind. As already indicated, the specific connection between elements in nature cannot be explained by the general or universal character of thought. Moreover, from the developmental standpoint one cannot understand how the cognitive process, which comes relatively late, could have evolved, if there were not a pre-existing order in the world within which the cognitive subject emerged. There can be no learning by experience if there is no meaning and order in experience from which to learn.

The world, from which life evolves, and mind from life, must be a world which possesses some unity and structure, even though mind, as we have argued, gives a further and more complete organisation to that world. There would, I think, be a fairly general agreement, at all events if you take mind in the sense of the mind of the individual or individuals, that it is intrinsically improbable that it makes the order of nature. The individual subject

can never constitute the multiplicity of relations and relata ; for those are data with which he has to deal, and are not the product of the synthetic activity of his mind. To introduce relations between data which have no intrinsic relatedness must remain an impossible feat, so long as the data themselves are not constituted by thought.

After recognising the formidable character of this difficulty, let us consider the plea of those who tell us the trouble is due to an imperfect or arrested idealism. An idealism of a wider scope contends that thought is more than personal, though it is shared by persons. Reason in its nature is universal, it includes the object in its own movement, and so constitutes the concrete or systematic unity of the one in the many. From this point of view things are not dependent on individual experience but on mind as universal. This, as you are aware, is the form of Absolute Idealism which is chiefly asso-

ciated with Hegel, and has been advocated in slightly varying forms by a number of thinkers in our own country. It has its own peculiar troubles with nature ; but I shall not discuss them, and shall assume the general character of this philosophy is known to you.

The particular point which requires elucidation is the relation of this idealism to the problem of the transcendent. On this theory there can be no lower and higher order between which there is a discontinuity for thought. For there is only the one real Being, the concrete universal and the true individual, which may be called the Absolute, or God, or the systematic unity of the whole. The objection to transcendence is the dualism it is said to involve ; for there can only be the one all-inclusive Absolute, and everything finite is "beyond escape" comprehended within it. Thought, by its inherent movement, cannot stop short of this goal. Our present concern is to

ask whether the elimination of the transcendent can be made consistent with the facts of experience? If not, this comprehensive synthesis fails.

Here let me say at the outset that many adherents of Absolute Idealism distinguish their position from that of pantheism, and are willing to accept transcendence in a certain modified sense. Thus it is explained that this theory does not assert what the so-called lower pantheism does, that God is present equally and in the same way in all objects. The divine, for instance, is present in a higher way in spirits than in nature, in a soul than in a stone. Likewise we are told that the Absolute transcends the finite mind, for the systematic whole in which all elements have their place and meaning goes beyond any individual or sum of individuals, and is richer and more complete. At the same time the transcendence is plainly a qualified one, for there is no break in the manifestation of the Absolute, and it is itself an

abstraction apart from the multiplicity of finite things and persons in which it is realised. There is no Beyond which is not continuous with the present order, and the "other world" is just the ideal and ever-present meaning of this world. But, we have contended, transcendence for the religious mind means more than this.

The crucial question, however, for this form of idealism is the significance and value which it can consistently assign to finite minds. Thinkers like the late Prof. Bosanquet were not concerned to maintain the ultimate reality of individual spirits, and speak frankly of their blending with and being merged in the Absolute Mind. But others, while still holding that the Absolute is all-inclusive, seek to show that finite personality is not an appearance merely but has a reality of its own. Thus Prof. Pringle Pattison contends that there is a qualitative transcendence of the Absolute which does not involve onto-

logical separateness ; and that self-hood is not a vanishing distinction but a unique expression of the Absolute.¹ And the late Prof. Royce, it may be remembered, conceived of the Absolute as expressing itself in a series of individuals, where each individual had its own place and meaning, and represented the whole in a specific and unique way.

The difficulty which the critic finds in this theory lies in the fact that it is an attempt to reconcile two principles which are not compatible. The self has to be unique and real, and, on the other hand, an element in the life of the Absolute. Yet if it is real in its own right, how can its being be the being of the Absolute whose expression it is? Surely this is to give with one hand and take away with the other ! The more consistent way would be to say that finite self-hood is merely appearance, and in reality there is but the one self, God or the Absolute.

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 255, 262, 269.

It has long been felt that the chief objection to this form of monistic idealism is its inability to deal with the problems raised by human personality, the consciousness of freedom, and the existence of moral evil. Monists argue that it is impossible to suppose that personality is something utterly distinct and impervious. We agree that it is not an isolated fact: it lives, grows, and defines itself through interaction with other persons in a social system. And yet this interaction intensifies rather than diminishes the distinctive consciousness of our own rights, duties, and responsibilities. However close we come, we still remain apart:

Yes, in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortals live alone.

This being-for-self cannot be fused with, or integrated into, the Universal Consciousness without losing its personal and unique quality. This unique conscious-

ness of self-hood is indissolubly linked with the consciousness of personal freedom. It is true, as the poet says, that "our wills are ours to make them Thine." But this community of will is an ideal, not a datum: it depends on and draws its value from an act of freedom on our part. If, when I say "I will," the truth is "God wills in me," my freedom vanishes and the act ceases to be my own. In terms of its premises monistic idealism cannot allow moral evil to wear its true guise: it must so far be rational, an incomplete good, a good in the making, a negative element whose true function is to mediate a higher good. It cannot in the full sense of the word be that which *ought* not to be. The moral consciousness, rooted in the sense of freedom, so regards it; but the absolutist, obsessed by the need of unification, gives short shrift to its testimony.

But consider, it is urged, where this apotheosis of freedom is leading you. The existence of free spirits other than

God means that God is limited by them. The theist will not deny this, though he will contend that the limitation is not that of an external necessity but is self-imposed. I will only add that, if the synthesis of monistic idealism conflicts with experience in the way we have tried to show, then it has failed to eliminate the transcendent.

Philosophical thinkers, like Spinoza and Hegel, who set out from an absolute principle, are constrained to deal in cavalier fashion with refractory elements. As Prof. Ward has urged, we are more likely to do justice to the facts if we advance from the many, and tentatively approach the conception of the One. There is at least less danger, by this method, of arbitrarily forcing the facts into the mould we have prepared for them. If we follow this humbler and less hazardous path, I think we shall find that it leads to a conception of the universe in which the transcendent has a part to play. Perhaps it may help

the argument and clarify the issues, if I make a short reference to three great thinkers whose thought has led them in this direction. I refer to Plato, Leibniz, and Kant.

Deeply rooted in Plato's mind is the thought of a suprasensible world which is behind the realm of earthly appearances and the change and decay incident to them. The ideal world of types or patterns is the explanation of the form and order in mundane things which are their imperfect reflexion. This higher world is not in very truth a spatial world, and we do not find it by looking up into the firmament.¹ These ideas are all related, and lead up to a supreme idea, the form of the Good which is transcendent, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. On the basis of this well-known passage in the VIth Book of the *Republic*, the idea of the Good has often been identified with God. But Plato himself does not say so, and in the later

¹ *Rep.*, 529 B.

Dialogues especially, God is conceived as a soul that is active and moves.¹

The argument that soul is self-moving leads up to the thought in the *Philebus* that God is a sovereign soul and reason, and in the *Timaeus* to the conclusion that He is the incorporeal cause of all things. In the *Laws*, Book X, this takes the form of a general argument from the order of nature to a supreme soul or God, who is the source of that order. The precise relation of God to the forms is not made explicit. But, as Plato suggests that they form a hierarchy, the natural inference is that they have their teleological ground in God, who apprehends them and realises the world-order through them. In face of the clearly expressed transcendence of the form of the Good, and of the distinction in the *Timaeus* between the Creator and the world-soul, Plato cannot have sup-

¹ In the *Sophist* (248 E) it is argued that we cannot deny movement, life and soul to the Supreme Being.

posed the Deity to be purely immanent. His regress from the shifting and unstable world of sense leads to the abiding realm of forms ; and God, the ground of all the forms, is the final measure of all things.¹ We are probably true to Plato's thought if we say that for him the world is an ordered whole or teleological structure, the contemplation of which guides us upward to a supreme and transcendent Spirit who is its ultimate source and ground.

In Leibniz we also find a regress from the multiplicity of elements in the world to God as their Sufficient Reason. It is true his monads, which are active spiritual substances, are self-centred and internally complete, each developing its whole experience from within. But though Leibniz's logic led him to this view—a view which if severely pressed would end in solipsism—it could not be carried out with rigorous consistency. There is correspondence

¹ *Laws*, 716 C. Cp. *Rep.*, 504 C.

and there is harmony between his monads or elements, and they form one world of related and interconnected things. In other words, they form a world not of abstract but of realised possibilities, a world in which each element is "compossible" or coherent with the other elements within the whole. And the world as fact must have its sufficient reason, and this is God. That God is not the immanent unity of the system is tolerably clear. The monads, in all their various stages, are governed by an inner teleology, and they lead up in a graduated scale to a supreme monad or God, who is in perfection that which they are in part. The world is an ordered state, a "city of God," and God is its King.¹ That Leibniz is in agreement with Plato in making God the transcendent ground of the teleologically ordered world is attested by two brief passages which I cite: "The sufficient reason, which has no need of any other reason, must needs

¹ *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, sec. 15.

be outside the sequence of contingent things"; "It (the dominant unity of the universe) is higher than the world, and so *extra mundum*." ¹

With Kant the transcendent is never in question: it enters into the substance of his thought. But, as remarked already, he separates the two worlds so sharply that the unity of experience is broken. So far as he is able to heal the division he does it by reference to that teleological principle to which he had denied constitutive value in the sphere of science, but had rehabilitated in the domain of ethics. Consistency is not a virtue of Kant, yet it is not hard to discern the trend of his thought on this matter. The fact of freedom, with its correlate, the moral law, attests the reality of that noumenal world, which must be the ground of the world of appearances. Our moral consciousness is the light which

¹ *Op. cit.*, sec. 8. *On the Ultimate Origination of Things*, at the beginning. Both passages are cited from Latta's translation of Leibniz.

guides us to the conception of a kingdom of ends whose head is God. And for Kant, no less than for Leibniz, God, the ground of the system of things, is above and beyond the system.

No doubt from the theoretical point of view the idea of God remains regulative merely, yet the God who, for Kant, is bound up with the moral values, is and must be real. Hence he appears to suggest that God is the source of the inner adaptation of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, the archetypal mind that contains within itself the ideal connected order which is reflected in the world of temporal and spatial representations.¹ To speak of God as transcendent cause would no doubt sin against the letter of the Kantian epistemology. But phenomenal causality means no more for Kant than necessary order in time. Dynamic

¹ Kant offers his justification of this idea in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. *Vide* Kehrbach's ed. of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, pp. 538 ff. Cp. also Paulsen's *Immanuel Kant : sein Leben und seine Lehre*, pp. 278-80.

causality belongs only to the noumenal world. And if exercised by man in this sphere, it can hardly be denied to God.

Kant's difficulties in bringing the phenomenal into any intimate relation with the transcendent order are, partly at least, of his own creating. The doctrine of degrees of reality, familiar to Plato, and the idea of development, so important with Leibniz and in modern thought, are foreign to his way of thinking. Hence his use of the teleological principle is halting, always fettered by the reflection that it is regulative rather than constitutive. A wider and bolder use of it would give different results, as we see in Plato and Leibniz. The lower and higher worlds will then take their places as stages of a development, where that which has a lower degree of reality leads up to that which possesses a higher. To speak, with Kant, of a realm of mere appearances is not consistent, for an appearance is meaningless if there be not something which appears.

Conceptual space and time, for instance, should not be regarded as a complete and final reality, but they cannot be relegated to the domain of the unreal. For they are *bene fundata*, developed out of the more fundamental facts of order, change, and duration ; and they serve to express in a generalised form our social interpretation of what is given in experience. Stated in terms of quantity they vary with varying frames of reference, and there are realities to which they are irrelevant ; nevertheless, they only become illusory when we take them for more than they are. We do so if we suppose that existence within our public space and time is an adequate criterion of reality. The transcendent *ipso facto* is not comprehended within the spatial and temporal order.

Beyond question, however, the fact that language, which is the medium of thought, is so deeply infected with the imagery of space and time makes it wellnigh impos-

sible to be consistent when we seek to give definiteness to our ideas of the transcendent. It is a difficulty which theology has experienced to the full. Hence in his references to the supramundane sphere man has to fall back on analogies and symbols, and the language must be inadequate, though it need not be false. Yet it is hard to see how it could convey any measure of truth at all, if the higher world were absolutely divorced from the lower. Hence there must be, here and now, some experience of the "power of the world to come," if our symbols are not to mislead.

The problem of the relation of the mundane to the supramundane cannot be perfectly solved. It centres in the question how we are to conceive the transcendent God in His relation to spatial and temporal facts. An appeal to faith will hardly serve in this instance. The reply of theism has usually been in the doctrine of creation. The doctrine, I believe, contains an element of truth, but it is commonly stated

in a form which is entangled in contradictions. It has often been pointed out that we cannot think of the world having an origin at a point in time. For in so doing we hypostatise the abstraction of empty time, while our conceptual time has no meaning apart from the sequence of events out of which it has been developed.

The notion of creation itself is an anthropomorphic idea, and no human analogy, not even the creative activity of the poet, can adequately signify what is implied in divine creation. Yet the word expresses, however haltingly, something which is true and valuable. It denotes the complete and timeless dependence of the world and all its elements on God who is its transcendent ground. Yet the relation is asymmetrical, and we cannot say that God is equally dependent on the world. The acceptance of creation in this sense means the admission of a discontinuity, a break which we cannot resolve. The attempts to resolve it always come

back to the theory that the universe is a single system or individual, and this, we have tried to show, will not square with the facts of experience. The task of perfect unification lies beyond our powers. The categories and forms of thought which the finite mind has developed in dealing with processes in space and time are not an adequate measure of all things, and even our deepest experiences cannot be perfectly translated into thought. Dante, when he speaks of the Beatific Vision, is fain to confess :

Oh quanto è corto'l dire e come fioco
Al mio concetto ! a quel ch' io vidi.

And the ἀκρίβεια, which Plato desiderated in those who treat of the highest problems, remains an elusive ideal.

If we accept the idea of creation in the sense so briefly indicated, what kind of meaning can we give to the notion of the divine immanence ? God, we have argued, transcends the world, and so also transcends

those spatial and temporal representations in which we habitually envisage our experience. Still, to say that the principle of immanence has no meaning at all would contradict the deeper experiences of religion. Immanence must stand for a truth, yet those who speak on the subject are often very vague and take refuge in words. Thus a contemporary philosopher tells us that God is "the superior integration of our individual experiences, and though not exhausted within us does not live without us" (Aliotta). This specious statement I cannot find impressive. Human experiences are very varied, and some of them far from estimable ; and if the statement means that our experience is at once our own and God's we demur. I think therefore we must reject as neither verified nor true to the religious experience the idea that the being of God is present within and can be identified with natural objects or human souls.

If we reject this identification, it does

not follow that we are compelled to set the Deity over against the world in a purely external fashion. For there is here an unwarrantable intrusion of spatial and temporal representations. To speak of God as far removed from the world is tacitly to suppose that space and time include God along with finite things. Yet the ideas of *here* but not *there*, of *now* but not *then*, have no relevance to the transcendent Ground of the universe.¹ The notion of the divine energy requiring to travel from one point to another is an inaccurate and misleading metaphor. All elements, both in the natural and the spiritual order, must be alike present to God, who constantly sustains them, though He is not identical with any of them. For God, as Lotze said, no specific point has

¹ It is curious to find that contemporary scientific thinkers are throwing out the idea that the ultimate elements of atomic structure are not capable of adequate interpretation in terms of space-time. On this point we may refer to Eddington's exposition of the New Quantum theory in his lectures on *The Nature of the Physical World*, chap. x.

the exclusive value of the present, and every event has a meaning for Him. From this point of view there is no relevancy in the complaint that transcendency denotes a *deus absconditus*. So conceived we cannot with any propriety speak of God as far from any one of us, or excluded from constantly affecting the inner life of man.

The true significance attaching to the conception of immanence may be put in this way. All elements in the world-order upon which life develops, and all phases of life itself, are dependent on the transcendent ground we call God : apart from Him they would not be. The ever-present divine activity is the ultimate condition of all derivative activities within the universe. This activity, conceived after the analogy of will, sustaining, supplementing, and quickening, is what we mean by divine immanence. At no point within the world-development is there independence in the elements, though there is a rela-

tively greater independence in the realm of self-conscious spirits. In the kingdom of souls the divine energy is present in new and higher ways ; and the interaction between spirit and spirit is something deeper and more intimate than the divine activity which is exercised on material things. What was begun in the realm of " nature " is crowned and completed in the realm of " grace." Hence it is true to say that God governs His universe from within, and in this sense is an immanent God. But immanence so defined draws its meaning from transcendence, and contains no suggestion that the divine essence passes into things and persons. Intimacy of communion, far from depending on fusion of being, is not really compatible with it.

The philosophical justification does not therefore take the form of a line of deductive argument. As in the case of the old Theistic Proofs, the conclusion of such an argument would go beyond the implica-

tions of the premises. But we are led to endorse the reality of the transcendent by our desire to be loyal to the facts of experience, and also by our conviction that unification, which operates as a motive in science and philosophy, in its completeness is and must be an unrealisable ideal. Moreover, since the fact of the transcendent does not conflict with our organised body of knowledge, there is nothing irrational in accepting it.

Those who like to proclaim the postulate of the transcendent to be a mere venture of faith are invited to remember that it is only a specific illustration of a very wide principle. It is just the final expression of a way in which the human mind habitually reacts on its experienced world. Man is essentially forward-looking, constantly facing a future with which he will have to deal and yet cannot confidently foretell from the knowledge he possesses. In this situation he exercises faith : faith in the form of trust is present in the feeble dawn

of knowledge, and at no point in the evolution of knowledge does it cease to play a part. In the affairs of life the offices of faith are conspicuously in evidence. This is inevitable in the case of mortals who live within the time-process, whose course marks a perpetual transition to an unknown future, and who are always striving after ends whose realisation lies beyond the present.

Faith, then, enters into the very form and texture of human experience as an ever-developing process. The religious faith, which postulates the transcendent world, is only the ultimate outcome of a movement of mind which is active at every stage of man's long and eventful history.¹ Beginning with an outlook bounded by the things of sense, faith, in the race and the individual, has risen gradually to the vision of a transcendent world. A large survey of the evolution of man's spiritual life amply warrants us

¹ Cp. on this point Ward, *Essays*, p. 110.

in concluding that the religious exercise of faith is rooted in universal human needs, and emerges from the form and pressure of life itself. Just let me add one word of caution. So to vindicate the rights of faith is not to justify all the representations of the transcendent put forward in the name of faith. When we strive to envisage the transcendent we must perforce use the language of symbol.

Finally, I wish to urge that the view outlined in this lecture is reasonable, using reason in the sense to which I have already referred, in the broad sense of that which gives some degree of coherence to our outlook on life. Philosophy, whatever the measure of its possible achievement, must at least try to be synoptic, to "think things together." The given world, then, and the transcendent world cannot be arbitrarily or accidentally related, nor can they be so separated from one another that there can be no interpenetration of the lower by the higher. Even Kant, who drew the

line of demarcation so sharply, thought of man as a member of both worlds. The most helpful way of approach to this problem is the teleological conception of development. Though we cannot make explicit the definite relations between the two orders, from a more general point of view we may regard the relation as one of inner adaptation, of means and end. The unity of the whole is a unity of spiritual development ; and the presence of a discontinuity within the process is no more than exists in natural evolution, where we accept the fact in " natural piety " without being able to explain it. The physical world interpreted by science is a world conceived in terms of spatial and temporal magnitudes, and is relatively abstract and incomplete. It yields meaning just because there are minds to interpret it, minds for whose emergence it furnishes the basis, and they in their turn unfold a higher order of reality.

The line of advance may be illustrated

by the way in which causal conceptions pass into ends and values. The scientific idea of cause and effect is partial and abstract: the given relation expands beyond itself into a system of causes and effects in which it is grounded. From this larger point of view we find in the system the end or final cause to which the specific causal relations are referred, just as an organism is taken to be the end of the relations between its interacting members. The notion of end acquires a new significance in the realm of human conduct, for here a causality of ends is dominant, and the scientific category of cause cannot explain the facts. So out of the teleologically ordered life of man arises the conception of realised ends as values which are qualitative. In the domain of the moral and spiritual values quantitative measurements have ceased to count, and the world of distances and magnitudes has been left behind. Thus we gather that in the interpretation of

experience, which is the great contribution of the finite mind, there is a movement which leads from the causal order in space and time to an order which qualitatively transcends it.

Regarded from the subjective standpoint, that of the experient mind, values would appear to be ultimate. But if we stand apart and survey the whole process, the category of end becomes final. To the finite mind teleology is the limit of unification: God who is the *ἀρχή*, is also the *τέλος*, to which "the whole creation moves." Seen in this light the whole body of our experience gains the meaning and coherence which the religious spirit demands. Religion cannot live in a world which is the theatre where aimless forces play the leading part, nor can it reconcile itself to the thought that the drama of existence is a meaningless spectacle and the human actors "such stuff as dreams are made on."

But just as little can we justify those

aspirations and ideals which are the life of upward endeavour, if this "bourne of time and place" is the only reality. The anomalies and contradictions of this earthly history are always patent, and if there be no sure and certain hope of a goal beyond it, the prospect is obscure and disconcerting. The enigmas of life become at least less baffling, when we come to rest in the thought that this is not the last act of the human drama. The New Testament writer set forth in symbol an idea to which Christian souls have steadily clung: "Here we have no continuing city, but we seek one to come." For those who feel the pathos of mortality, and they are many, this is not the language of a spurious idealism. To value this world aright our vision must extend beyond it.

NOTES

I. THE NATURAL ORDER, MIND, AND THE TRANSCENDENT.

II. IMMORTALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENT.

NOTE I

THE NATURAL ORDER, MIND, AND THE TRANSCENDENT

IT seems desirable to add some words on this subject to make the point of view more explicit, and to deal with certain problems and difficulties for which there was no time in the lectures. First of all, what do we exactly mean by the natural order? Is it something given to mind? or is it something which depends on mind? Put in this way it is hard to give an answer which does not involve qualifications. Obviously the order of nature with which the physical sciences are concerned is an order envisaged in terms of the cognising mind, and bears on it the impress of mind. The space and time by which we measure phenomenal processes, the constant relation

of qualities to substances and of effects to causes, would not be possible apart from conceptual thinking. When we proceed on the assumption that "once true is always true," when connections and sequences are treated as typical or constant, then the work of mind is presupposed in developing this universal way of viewing things. In short, to mind we trace the world of scientific formulæ, of universal sequences, and of laws of nature.

On the other hand, the knowing process is always dependent on data. It cannot construct a world out of the void in the way that imagination can; and the activity of reason itself is conditioned by the presence of things demanding to be rationalised. Knowledge is always "knowledge of," and so always refers to a context of elements which is not its own creation that it may be stimulated to activity.

But when we proceed to ask what these given elements are, our perplexities begin.

We cannot like the materialists describe in terms of sense-perception entities which are conceived to exist apart from it. Yet it is equally absurd to suppose that the objective order, which is the basis and the stimulus of the knowing activity, is itself projected by mind. On the other hand, if what is given to mind has no intrinsic affinity to mind, the synthesis of knowledge becomes unintelligible. In this connection it is well to remember that the traditional contrast of mind and matter is a purely artificial point of view. The crude matter of the materialist has no existence anywhere. That vague general substratum of things is now discredited by modern physics, and has been replaced by the more intangible notion of energy. Instead of a continuous medium forming the basis of the world of experienced qualities, there have been substituted events in space-time. These events, possessing a certain rhythm or pattern, are all that is left of the so-called solid object. The

present conclusions of mathematical physics are, however, only provisional, and probably mark a transition to fresh conceptions. In any case, it is not suggested that the world of objects is a mental pattern woven out of nothing : there remains a body of relata and relations which are not created by the cognising subject but given to it. I am afraid that to term these data mind-stuff is apt to convey misleading suggestions, though as organic to mind they may be properly judged to have some affinity with it. Thought cannot develop on a basis entirely alien to itself.

Something, then, is given to the cognising subject, and, on any showing, this cannot be a chaos of unrelated elements : it must have some degree of structure and unity. Further, these data must exhibit in themselves the character of change as well as that of co-existence. The experience of duration is more primitive than that of conceptual time ; but it is

hard to see how there could be the sense of duration unless duration were at least vaguely defined for consciousness through the experience of changes in the non-mental context. And even though this were possible, an inner life which has experience simply of duration, in the sense of the passage of time, would have no means of reaching the idea of co-existence.¹ In short, the development of the subject as a centre of inner experience is dependent on certain characters in the trans-subjective data with which it deals. These form the indispensable conditions for that work of ideal construction by which the developing mind, through language the medium of conceptual activity, elaborates the common social world of substances and causes, qualities and relations, conceived to be located in space and time.

¹ That is to say, if co-existence is not given independently to mind, there is nothing in mind, taking the form of a succession of states, which would enable it to judge that A and B, apprehended in succession, are none-the-less co-existent.

It has been suggested that the medium out of which the outer and inner worlds have been differentiated is something that is neither matter nor mind, but has in some degree the qualities of both. To this theory the name "neutral monism" has been given. To this doctrine the objection at once suggests itself, that it fails to give due weight to the status of mind in the world of experience. For it traces the genesis of mind to a neutral medium which is its final basis. Can we suppose the medium has the intrinsic potentialities that will explain the process of differentiation and integration which is implied in the emergence of mind? It is easy to invoke the conception of emergent evolution whereby new qualities appear, not explicable in terms of what has gone before. But the acceptance of this type of evolution provides no real solution of the difficulty. Emergent evolution may be taken to be a fact, but it is not a fact which explains itself. To credit a neutral medium with

resources to bring about by creative evolution a new hierarchy of qualities means an act of faith which there is nothing whatever to justify. The situation is changed, however, if we suppose that mind or spirit, which comes last in the order of development, gives us the clue to the conditions and meaning of development. We reach a more satisfying solution of the problem if we assume that the basal elements on which evolution supervenes are centres of derivative energy and activity in constant dependence on God, the supreme Ground of all. The sufficient reason of the process cannot lie in such abstractions as the space-time continuum nor in a hypothetical neutral stuff. The activity of a Supreme Spirit is the ultimate ground of the emergence of finite spirits.

Through the development of mind, which interprets and organises its data into the world of our common experience, we gather the place and significance of

the idea of the transcendent. Of course, were it possible to hold, with some idealists, that the outer and the inner worlds were only phases or stages of mind, there could be little or no room for the transcendent. But this theory, we have already tried to show, is unworkable. The relations and the relata, the changing and co-existing elements, are the data out of which the interpreting and connecting mind gradually fashions that orderly world of phenomena with which we are familiar. It is a world *bene fundatum*, a world not created but moulded and articulated by experient subjects who interpret it through the medium of their own experience. Yet this world of separate existences envisaged in the forms of space and time does not cover the whole field of reality. With the growth of its inner life the mind becomes conscious that there are realities which cannot be fitted into the scheme of temporal and spatial existence. And yet they are not to be dismissed as mental fictions.

The world of ideal relations, of mathematical truths, for example, is one which if true is timelessly true.

Then there are moral and spiritual values which cannot be represented in time and space. These are often spoken of as real but *subsisting*, not existing. The point is that, if you take existence in the sense indicated, the sphere of reality goes beyond or transcends that of existence. These realities, though they bear a relation to the existing world, cannot be represented in terms of phenomena. The ideal values stand for qualities of a higher order, and here as elsewhere the higher cannot be explained in terms of the lower. Nor can thought show an unbroken continuity between the two. Yet the two orders are not divorced from one another, for man as a natural and a spiritual being, an embodied mind, is a member of both worlds: he apprehends the world of temporal facts and the world of eternal values. In the higher sphere

scientific knowledge becomes inadequate, and man exercises faith.

For some this idea of two orders, distinct and yet related, will always present difficulties. But certain considerations make for its acceptance, and these rest on facts of human experience. First of all we have to remember the mind has developed its categories and forms of knowing to deal with data which it did not create. But the world, as it is organised by conceptual thinking, is a phenomenal world in which mind can find itself and with which it can deal. Developing mind thus becomes habituated to the use of forms of thought which are relevant to a specific purpose, and it can never quite escape from their dominion. Constantly accustomed to interpret experiences in a spatial and temporal setting, it cannot shake itself free from the intrusive imagery of space and time. Consequently, when thought seeks to rise above the realm of empirical existences, it can only use language

permeated with analogies drawn from the world of sense ; and these in the nature of the case are imperfect.¹ Nevertheless, there is a deeper side to human life, and it unambiguously attests the truth of realities which it is impossible to reduce to facts in the empirical context. The soul has experiences of supreme values, of a truth, a good, and a beauty which can never be adequately embodied in any setting of sensible fact. And the absolute character of these ideals is a warrant for our faith that they belong to a realm which transcends the world of sensible existences.

On the view here suggested the universe has its ground in that transcendent spiritual Reality we call God. The rudimentary and dependent order sustained and energised by God forms the basis for that more fully articulated order which is due to

¹ Goethe, in 1825, wrote: "Das Wahre, mit dem Göttlichen identisch, lässt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen ; wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten Erscheinungen."—Quoted by Ritter, *Platon*, vol. i, p. 579.

the co-operation of minds. Mind again, when it rises to fully developed self-consciousness, postulates the reality of a transcendent sphere wherein lie its goal and final fulfilment. The movement is teleological throughout, and the realm of empirical existences is a stage of the process. But the empirical world has its ultimate meaning and value through its relation to the transcendent world.

NOTE II

IMMORTALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENT

PROBABLY it has occurred to some to ask how the conception of the transcendent bears on the problem of the life after death. On this subject we have said little in the lectures, though it was pointed out that the moral life postulates the reality of its ideals in a realm which transcends the relative values at work in the historic process, and in this realm the soul posits its own goal and self-fulfilment. But some questions naturally arise here, and these are not answered by a simple reference to the transcendent. I do not think these questions can receive more than a tentative and provisional answer, and yet to ignore them altogether would be unsatisfactory.

The question may be put : Can we con-

ceive a future life that has any kind of relation to the present life, and yet contains no reference to a framework of space and time? If the higher world transcends this given world of spatial and temporal relations, can it be a world in which the soul recognises its life there to have some kind of continuity with the life on earth? Indeed, can we think of any state of the spirit hereafter which absolutely transcends time, even though it does not occupy space? Certainly the notion of an absolutely fixed and changeless state, which had no before or after, would for most of us, constituted as we are, be an object of dread rather than of hope. One could not well envisage in such terms a life which was the consummation and fulfilment of the life than now is.

Here the first thing to remember is, that a future state cannot possibly be some kind of reproduction of the present. Death marks the term where the imagery of this phenomenal world ceases to be

valid, and the rash use in popular religious thought of earthly pictures and analogies has provoked a reaction towards agnosticism on the subject of the future life. The realm of faith, it is right to insist, must always extend beyond the region of mental representation ; and the attempt to represent the higher world in terms of the lower only ends in contradictions. Any suggestions we can make on this difficult theme we offer in the light of what we conceive the transcendent really to mean. It means that the conceptual world of our common experience, a world articulated in terms of human activities and purposes, has been transcended. The whole system of quantitative measurements, which are essentially relative to the human time-span, ceases to be relevant. But it does not follow that the fundamental data presupposed by conceptual thinking, data which involve an order within which change and co-existence of elements are present, are transcended. The supra-

mundane sphere may be one where minds co-exist and change plays a part, although it is a sphere qualitatively different from the existing form of temporal and spatial experience. Thus the Christian idea of "eternal life" is one in which quantitative extension in time no longer counts.

The transition from an existing order to a qualitatively higher order is in these days a less hazardous hypothesis than it would have been a generation ago; for then the conception of emergent new qualities, and of discontinuities in the developmental process, was less familiar. Nor will the venture of faith in a life beyond seem overbold, when we recognise the status of mind in the world of experience. The co-operation of minds has been the means of organising the scientific and social order of things; and in the development of individual existences into personal and self-conscious spirits the activity of the self has been fundamental. And if the self is central, intrinsically active, and con-

structive, there is nothing contradictory in supposing that it may organise a new and higher integration of elements for its own expression in a higher form of being. Such a belief would be in keeping with the view, put forward in the lectures, that the natural order is only one aspect of human life, and even here and now the soul is a member of a superior world.

Here again fresh problems thrust themselves upon us. Only on two of them can I add a word. In regard to the character of the life to come, we can hardly conceive it consistently apart from a social order or society of selves. The whole evolution of personal life, while it rests primarily on the activity of the self, is yet conditioned by interaction with other selves. A developed personality is made possible by society, and a self divorced from a social medium would part with much of its meaning and value. Certainly if the higher life is to be conceived as one of possible development, one cannot imagine that

this development could take place in isolation. Yet undoubtedly development in a transcendent order would be something different from mundane development, for the conditions are no longer the same. The old environment with its specific character has been left behind.

But speculation on these high matters must be, for those who only "know in part," at the best inconclusive. For example, some may find satisfaction in the thought that the ultimate consummation of development hereafter is the final return of all souls into God, the source of their being. Others may like to hold that the individual soul retains its identity to all eternity. In this matter we may find we can reach no conclusion, unless we are prepared to invoke authority and tradition.

I will only add that the suggestions thrown out here, as well as the general line of thought in the lectures, are based on the conviction that the universe, notwithstanding the discontinuities which exist

within it for human thinking, is throughout a teleological structure where the order of spiritual values is supreme. It reveals a Divine Mind that has seen the end in the beginning.

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